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ABSTRACT
Research into new uses for known drugs should be encouraged
because the “repurposing” of known drug molecules can be a highly
effective route of innovation for pharmaceutical companies.
Investment in the development of these products should be rewarded.
However, incentives that are designed to reward innovation must be
in line with the size and value of the innovation in order to maintain a
sustainable balance between incentivizing research and developing
and encouraging a competitive market. In the context of encouraging
innovation of new uses for known drugs, factors that facilitate access
to drug development and innovation should also be considered in
addition to incentives.
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INTRODUCTION
Both innovative and generic pharmaceutical companies may
invest in research into new uses for known drugs. This “repurposing”
of known drug molecules can be an effective route for innovation
Most importantly, it takes advantage of the extensive body of
knowledge, research, and clinical experience that has already been
gained through the use of known treatments. By combining this body
of data with technological advances made since the discovery of a
given drug molecule, significant and previously unknown uses for
such drugs may be uncovered.
The future of the pharmaceutical industry, and the patients who
rely on it, depends on the continuous development of new and
improved treatments. Innovation is important—this is as true for the
generic medicine sector as it is for “innovative” pharmaceutical
companies. Generic pharmaceutical companies depend on innovation
in the pharmaceutical industry, and recognize that innovation can be
risky and may require substantial investment in research and
development. Such investment should certainly be rewarded.
However, it is important to maintain a fair balance between rewarding
innovation and assuring patients’ access to affordable healthcare.
Incentives designed to reward innovation must be in line with the size
and value of the innovation in order to maintain a sustainable balance
between the goal of incentivizing innovation and of rationalizing
health care budgets through generic entry into the market.
Despite the above, generic pharmaceutical companies are often
characterized as opposing incentives for innovation. This may be
because their business models sometimes comprise of bringing legal
challenges with the aim of invalidating exclusivities that are designed
to provide incentives to innovate. However, it does not follow from
this that generic companies do not support incentives for innovation.
In fact, the reverse is true: generic companies support sensible rewards
and incentives for innovation. What they oppose are rewards
disproportionate to the actual degree of innovation and amount of
effort required to benefit from the reward, and the abuse of such
incentives to prevent the legitimate market entry of competitors.
Systems currently exist to govern how medicines are developed,
licensed, protected, and priced; each has the potential to encourage or,
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if mismanaged, to stifle innovation. In Europe, the development of
novel medicinal compounds is incentivized and rewarded in a way
that is regarded by industry and effective and beneficial overall.
However, incentives and rewards are not as beneficial or effective
when they concern innovations in treatment made from developing
already-known substances for new uses, formulations, methods of
delivery and so on.
This Article focuses on the development of new treatments by the
repurposing of known drugs. The debate on how to encourage
innovation in this area usually centers on the incentives available for
repurposed drugs. This Article considers such incentives, but also
looks at another important aspect: how access to various key
components of the field—such as data, funding, and skills—can be
critical to the successful development of a repurposed drug product. It
suggests that the current system of incentives is unbalanced, with new
active substances receiving extensive protection and with innovations
based on development of known active substances receiving little or
effectively no reward.
It is possible to strike a better balance between encouraging
innovation in known drugs by rewarding innovation and improving
access to data and other key elements, and allowing for optimal access
to the market to the benefit of all stakeholders. Industry and payors—
primarily the National Health Services of the Member States in
Europe—have the same goals: providing broad availability of fairly
priced quality medicines. Patients often want new treatments, but
would also benefit from treatments that could be developed from
known medicines, which could be made available more quickly due
to their confirmed safety. These may also offer other advantages over
the older drug, such as being more convenient to take or having a more
convenient dosing regimen.
More can be done better to incentivize patient-focused
development of known drugs. A new system of incentives should
recognize that developing known drugs may be cheaper and require
less investment while nevertheless providing a marked improvement
in patient care. This Article proposes that a reward system where the
duration and extent of the reward is tied to the size of the innovation
would ultimately benefit the industry.
The pharmaceutical industry is capable of repurposing drugs. In
particular, generic companies are well-positioned to make patientfocused developments of known treatments. Generic companies are
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particularly focused on understanding the demands of the market and
delivering products that the market wants in a competitive, nonexclusive and at times, commodity-driven environment. Payors also
benefit from such innovations; patients who understand their
treatment regimens and better comply with them may save Health
Services money by putting fewer demands on healthcare providers.1
However, without effective reward for the investment in identifying
and developing these sorts of innovation, companies may not pursue
opportunities, for fear that they may fail to deliver sufficient financial
return.
I.

INCENTIVES – ISSUES AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

The pharmaceutical industry plays a unique role in the functioning
and advancement of society; that role is recognized in the particular
systems of reward, authorization, and pricing for health care products.
In particular, the high cost of development of new treatments versus
the relatively low cost to third parties of copying such discoveries
means that a robust scheme of protection of innovation is needed in
order to reward investment in new treatments for patients. Such a
scheme has been developed through the patent and regulatory systems
which reward innovation through the granting of exclusivities which
provide a market monopoly for a fixed period. However, for
innovations in treatment that arise from repurposing known drugs,
these same systems are not always as effective. This is not a result of
a deliberate policy to offer less protection to repurposed drugs, 2 but
because current systems offer inadequate protection and certainty. If
investment in new uses for known drugs is to be encouraged, this
situation must change. Although the development of a repurposed
drug would usually be more straightforward than the development of
an entirely new drug, it may still require substantial effort and
investment. It is therefore important to provide incentives for

1

Aurel O. Iuga & Maura J. McGuire, Adherence and Health Care Costs, 7 RISK
MGMT. & HEALTHCARE POL'Y 35 (2014),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3934668/.
2
The “new” use of a repurposed drug may sometimes be referred to as a “second
medical use”.
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investment, though any such incentives should of course be
proportionate to the effort and investment required to develop the
repurposed product.
In Europe, the market protection available for medicinal products
may broadly be divided into two categories. The first comprises the
intellectual property exclusivities awarded by the patent system. The
second consists ofthe regulatory exclusivities available by virtue of
the functioning of the regulatory legal framework i.e. the system for
granting marketing authorizations for medicinal products as overseen
by various Regulatory Agencies.
A. Issue: Patents3
1. The Current Framework
A patent provides the right to prevent others from selling,
developing, manufacturing or distributing a product, or from
conducting a process, that is covered by the patent in question.4 The
term of European patent protection is twenty years from the filing
date.5
The product or process described in the patent must be both
novel—that is, not described anywhere in the world prior to the
priority date of the patent—and inventive—that is, “not obvious” to a
hypothetical non-inventive skilled person.6 The invention must also

3

This section discusses a number of different cases relevant to the patent
protection that is available for repurposed medicines. This article does not
provide an exhaustive review of the case law in this area and the cases
mentioned are only discussed in order to provide illustrative examples of the
problems that have been encountered in this field.
4
Acts that infringe a European patent are governed by national law see
Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention),
art. 63, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, as amended by the Act Revising the
European Patent Convention, Nov. 29, 2000, available at http://
documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/00E0CD7FD461C0D5C125
7C060050C376/ $File/EPC_15th_edition_2013.pdf. The relevant national
law in the United Kingdom, for example, is the Patents Act, 1977, ch. 37, §
60.
5
Id. at art. 63.
6
Id. at art. 54 and 56.
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be clearly disclosed:7 enabling the public to perform the invention
once the term of protection has expired is the quid pro quo for
providing the monopoly. Finally, the inventions must be “patentable
subject matter”, that is subject matter that is not excluded from
protection.8 The patent system therefore protects adequately disclosed
innovation in the literal sense of inventions that are “new” and “notobvious”. Drugs that consist of novel chemical compounds are
invariably protected by patents and therefore the developer of the drug
benefits from a twenty-year monopoly, during which no competitor
can produce a generic version of the drug. 9
In the pharmaceutical sector, extensive research and testing is
necessary for the development of medicines. Further, regulatory
approval is required before a medicine can be placed on the market.10
Due to the increasing complexity of medical research and
development, and to compensate for the extensive period of time
needed to obtain a regulatory approval, the European Parliament
introduced a Supplementary Protection Certificate (“SPC”) system,11
which enabled the granting of additional protection to medicinal
products in the form of a product-specific extension to the term of the
patent.12 This enables the approved product that resulted from the
development and regulatory approval process to benefit from the
protection of the patent for an additional period of up to five years.13
This system provides compensation for the delay caused by the
regulatory approval process in reaching the market by enabling a

7

Id. at art. 83.
Id. at art 53. (listing certain things which may not be patented).
9
See supra note 6.
10
Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6
November 2001 on the Community Code relating to medicinal products for
human use, art. 6, 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67.
11
The current European legislation that governs SPCs is Regulation EC No.
469/2009, which replaced Regulation EC No. 1768/92.
12
Regulation (EC) No. 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
6 May 2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal
products, art. 4, 5 and 13, 2009 OJ (L 152) 1.
13
Id. at art. 13.
8
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longer presence on the market without generic competition.14 Since
SPCs are patent-based rewards, and provide an extension in duration
of the patent term based on the timetable to grant of marketing
authorization for a medicinal product protected by that patent, it is in
some senses a “hybrid” reward: based on both the patent protection
over a product and the marketing authorization granted to that product.
2. Patent Protection for Repurposed Drugs
It has long been recognized that the patent system appears to be
inadequate to protect discoveries based on the development of known
drugs.15 The first attempt in Europe to implement a system whereby it
was possible to patent the invention of second medical uses for known
products was the introduction of Swiss type claims. These were
introduced under the European Patent Convention of 1973 and were
so named because they were based on the advice and practice of the
Swiss Patent Office.16 They allowed the granting of patents for second
medical uses of known substances provided the claim was drafted in
the following format:
“Use of substance [X] for the manufacture of a
pharmaceutical composition for new therapeutic
application [Y].”
Their purpose was to turn subject matter previously excluded from
patentability—specifically, methods of treatment of the body—into
patentable subject matter. This is achieved by granting a claim that is
a joint product-and-process claim—albeit one that incorporates the
use for which the product and process is conducted. Swiss type claims
were superseded by the introduction of the European Patent
Convention 2000.17 Second medical use claims under the EPC 2000

14

Id.
See Mr. Justice Jacob, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd v Istituto Gantili Spa
& Ors [2003] EWHC 5 (Pat), and the overview of the problem provided by
Scott Parker and Ben Hall, Skinny labelling infringement: finding a fair
remedy, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MAGAZINE (Sept. 3, 2013),
http://www.intellectualpropertymagazine.com/patent/skinny-labellinginfringement-finding-a-fair-remedy-91356.htm.
16
Approval was given in decision G5/83 dated 5 December 1984.
17
Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention),
15
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are typically in the format:
“Use of substance [X] in new therapeutic application
[Y].”18
For some time, it was also uncertain whether SPCs could be
available for repurposed medicinal products. However, the decision
of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Neurim case
confirmed that such protection is available.19 The case concerned the
medicinal product melatonin, which had first been authorized as a
treatment for the control of seasonal breeding in sheep.20 Neurim had
subsequently obtained patent protection and a marketing authorization
for melatonin for treatment of insomnia in human adults.21 The
question for the Court was whether the first authorization to place the
product on the market in the EU for the purposes of granting an SPC
was the authorization for the veterinary product. If that had been the
case, then an SPC would not have been available. The court found
that, in practice, the first authorization for use in animals had offered
no assistance to Neurim, for whom it had taken fifteen years to get
their melatonin product to the market. The effect of the Court of
Justice decision was that Neurim could be rewarded, through the
granting of an SPC, for their work on developing melatonin for use in
humans despite the fact that melatonin was a known drug that had
previously been used in animals.
As discussed above, European legislators have decided that
discoveries of second medical uses for medicinal products should be
protectable under the patent system.22 Authorities that grant patents
have introduced the necessary architecture to grant such patents.
However, this has led to cases where courts attempt to reach the
“right” decision, but in doing so complicate this area of law. The
Neurim SPC case is one such example. This creative interpretation of

art. 54(5), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255.
European Patent Office Guidelines for Examination, Part G, Chapter VII,
Section 7.1.
19
See, e.g., Case C-130/11, Neurim Pharmaceuticals (1991) Ltd v ComptrollerGeneral of Patents, 2012 E.C.R.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
See supra notes 17, 18 and 19.
18
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the SPC Regulation was at odds with the black letter of the law as well
as numerous earlier SPC cases. This has led to some uncertainty in
other SPC cases and the necessity for further references by national
Courts to the Court of Justice of the European Union.
3. Problems with Patent Protection for Repurposed Drugs
Despite the checkered history of patent protection for repurposed
drugs, it is now accepted that patents which protect second medical
use claims are acceptable and that SPCs for such claims may be
available. Further, courts have recognized that it is possible to obtain
a patent and an SPC to protect a repurposed drug.23 However, the
utility of these exclusivity rights may still be compromised due to
problems relating to validity and enforceability. Both of these issues
have been considered by national Courts in Europe.
In the English case of Merck v. Teva & Arrow,24 Mr. Justice Jacob
commented on the validity problem. The drug at issue was
alendronate, which was discovered and used in the 1960s but was
repurposed in the 1990s for treatment of osteoporosis.25 Two
secondary medical use patents were challenged in the case. Both were
found to be invalid because of work done with a precursor compound
of alendronate called pyrophosphonate.26 Jacob found that this work
meant the patents must be invalid because it rendered use of
alendronate for the treatment of bone loss obvious.27 In his judgment,
commenting on his finding that both patents were invalid, Jacob said:
“I do so with some regret. Merck have only had a few
years' exclusive exploitation of alendronate. They must
surely have had to make a very considerable
investment and incurred considerable risk in bringing
it to market. And mankind is better off as a result.”
“But the patent system does not confer monopolies on

23

See supra note 20.
[2003] EWHC 5 (Pat).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at paragraphs 36 to 64. Note that the patents were also found invalid for lack
of novelty and because it was a method of treatment of the human body by
therapy.
24
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those who develop obvious or old products, even if
they have never been exploited. A workable system for
that might be a good idea, particularly in the field of
medicine and analogous fields.”
The problem with enforcement of second medical use patents is
illustrated by a decision of the Dutch Court of Appeal at The Hague
in preliminary relief proceedings regarding Novartis’ zoledronic acid
product.28 The patent concerned a second medical use of zoledronic
acid for the treatment of osteoporosis and the delivery mechanism and
dosage form of such. The first known—and no longer patented—use
for the drug was treatment of Paget’s disease. The Novartis marketing
authorization for Aclasta contained indications for treatment of
osteoporosis and Paget’s disease.29 Sun Pharmaceuticals, had
obtained a marketing authorization for its generic zoledronic acid
product with a so-called “skinny label” for the treatment of Paget’s
disease only. A “skinny label” is a term used for a generic marketing
authorization where one or more patent-protected indications granted
to the reference product have been excluded deliberately from the
generic label. Skinny labeling is provided for in Directive EC
2001/83—often referred to as the “Medicines Directive”—to account
for just such a situation.30 The idea is that a product with a skinny label
will not infringe patent rights because it does not instruct the user to
use the product in a way that would infringe the patent.
In this situation, it is clear, assuming the second medical use patent
is valid, that the patent should be enforceable against use in the
patented indication. However, it should not prevent market entry of a
generic product for use in treating indications for which there is no
patent protection in place. Taking the zolendronic acid example
above, assuming the patent for use of zolendronic acid for the
treatment of osteoporosis is valid, it ought to be possible to enforce it

28

Court of Appeal The Hague in Novartis AG v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries,
27 January 2015, case number C/09/460540 / KG ZA 14-185,
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:1769.
29
Id. at paragraph 2.7
30
Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6
November 2001 on the Community Code relating to medicinal products for
human use, art. 11, 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67.
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to prevent generic zolendronic acid products being used for the
treatment of osteoporosis. In relation to other indications for which
there is no patent protection, such as Paget's disease in the zolendronic
acid example, generic products should not be prevented from being
used. Skinny labeling of generic products deals with this problem in
theory as a skinny label excludes any patented indications. Therefore
generic products with a skinny label are not authorized for use in the
patented indications. However, although a skinny label can state that
the product should be used for the non-patented indications only, in
practice this does not necessarily prevent prescribing, dispensing, and
use of the generic product in patented indications. The producer of the
generic product does not have any control over how its product is
prescribed, dispensed, and used once it is on the market. It seems
unfair to penalize them via patent enforcement litigation if the generic
product ends up being used for patented indications. On the other
hand, a patentee ought to be able to enforce its patent.
In the Novartis case, the Dutch Court of Appeal decided to
approach this issue by considering whether, despite the use of the
skinny label, Sun knew or should have known that its product would
be used in a way that would infringe the patent—i.e. that it would be
used to treat the patented indications.31 The Court of Appeal found
that, notwithstanding the skinny label, Sun knew or should have
known that its product would be used for the patented indications: the
amount of product it supplied far exceeded the amount that would be
needed to meet patient need for the Paget disease indication. As a
consequence, the Court of Appeal held that Sun had conducted
contributory infringement of Novartis' patent, and handed down a
preliminary injunction against Sun. (In a more recent decision in
parallel proceedings on the merits, the Hague District Court has in an
interim decision held, on different grounds, that Sun had not
conducted contributory infringement of Novartis' patent32, but that it

31

Court of Appeal The Hague in Novartis AG v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries,
27 January 2015, case number C/09/460540 / KG ZA 14-185,
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:1769, paragraphs 4.33 - 4.34.
32
District Court The Hague in in Novartis AG v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries,
25 November 2015, case number C/09/469148 / HA ZA 14-770,
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:14337. The District Court held that because a Swiss
type claim is a purpose limited process claim and its protection does not also
cover the product itself, there can only be contributory infringement if a party
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cannot be excluded that it has directly infringed the patent.33)
The major problem with this approach, however, is a lack of
certainty. A patentee should be able to assume that its patents will not
be infringed, and third parties should be able to market a product for
uses that are not patent-protected without either party having to rely
on the Court to adjudicate.
Recent litigation in the UK High Court and Court of Appeal34
concerning the drug pregabalin further illustrates this problem. In
these proceedings, a number of the defendants had obtained market
authorization for their generic products using skinny labels. 35 In this
case, further measures were taken to prevent so-called off-label use,
in addition to ensuring that the marketing authorization granted was
for the skinny label only. One such measure was to write to the
superintendent pharmacists of all UK Clinical Commissioning
Groups, instructing them to inform their members that only Pfizer’s
brand product, Lyrica, was to be prescribed and/or dispensed for
treatment of the patented indications.36 The Court further sanctioned
written guidance to NHS England—as representative of the National
Health Service—which informed all prescribers and dispensers that
they should only prescribe or dispense Pfizer’s Lyrica for patented
indications.37 This litigation is still ongoing and so the issues are by
no means finally settled.
Exclusivities for known drugs that have been repurposed are
available, in theory, in the form of patent and SPC protection.

would supply an essential element knowing (or with reasonable grounds to
know) that this element would be used by a third party in applying the
protected process, i.e. manufacturing the drug. As Sun had only supplied the
already manufactured drug, Sun could not be said to have supplied an
essential element which would subsequently be used by third parties to
manufacture the drug.
33
Id. As the subject of direct infringement came up at a rather late stage of
proceedings, the District Court refused deferred a decision on this aspect of
the case, and requested parties to file additional deeds instead.
34
Warner-Lambert Company, LLC v. Actavis Group PTC EHF & Others, [2015]
EWHC 72 (Pat).
35
Id.
36
Id. from paragraph 78 onwards.
37
Id.
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However, in practice, the enforcement of these exclusivities is highly
problematic. This inherent uncertainty means that these protections do
not provide an appropriate or suitable system for incentivizing the
development of repurposed medicines.
B. Potential Solution: eHealth
Problems concerning the validity of second medical use patents
are difficult to resolve through the patent system. These are perhaps
better addressed by rewarding such innovations with regulatory
exclusivity, as discussed below. Similarly, the problems with
enforcement discussed above would be hard to solve through changes
to the patent system itself. However, enforcement issues can be
resolved by the increased use of eHealth38 technologies solutions and
technological support systems.
Take, for example, the problems that arise when attempting to
enforce a second medical use patent where there are both patented and
non-patented indications, and a generic company wishes to launch a
product with a skinny label directed at the non-patented indications.
This problem is illustrated by the zolendronic acid and pregabalin
cases discussed above.39 Such problems could be rectified by creating
a new mandatory prescribing and dispensing system. Requiring
prescriptions to include the indication for which the drug is prescribed
would remove the uncertainty around whether generic products are
being dispensed against patented indications despite using a skinny
label. Those who dispense prescriptions would become the gateway
towards ensuring that drugs are dispensed only as permitted. Such a
system would act to tie the prescription and dispensing of a drug to its
intended use. However, this scenario can only occur via mandating the
prescriber’s recording of the indicated use.
This system would help not only in ensuring that drugs are
prescribed in line with patent needs, but would also make any damages
claim easier to assess in the event of dispute about the validity of the
patent. Prescribing and dispensing data would show not only how
much of the relevant products were used, but would also show the

38

eHealth is a term used to describe health care practices that are supported by
electronic processes and communication.
39
See supra notes 29 and 32.
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proportion of the market that relates to each indication.
With the increased availability and sophistication of technologies
(such as ePrescribing40 and eHealth records) the infrastructure is in
place for this data to be generated and accessed.
1. An Example: The Substitution System in Denmark
Some countries in Europe are already taking steps that create
closer ties between patent protection and prescription decisions. In
2015, the Danish Health Authority implemented new rules on
substitution for prescriptions.41 In Denmark, generic medicines are in
the same “substitution group” as medicines that contain the same
active substance in the same quantity and that are “used in the same
way.”42
Under this new regime, which came into place on the basis of the
ruling of the Danish Maritime and Commercial High Court in the
Danish pregabalin case, pharmacies are not to substitute a generic
medicinal product for the brand if the prescription has been issued for
the treatment of a patent-protected indication. the Danish Medicines
Agency43 is to notify pharmacies when a medicinal product has a
patented indication. It is for the pharmaceutical companies to notify
the Danish Medicines Agency in writing of such patent protection for
its products.
On the other hand, pharmacies must substitute a generic medicine
for the brand if the medicinal product has been prescribed for the
treatment of a non-patented indication. This is only possible in a
system where prescribers are required to note for what purpose the

40

ePrescribing is a term used to describe computer based, generation of
prescriptions and electronic transmission directly to the pharmacist.
41
The Danish Ministerial Order on Prescriptions, § 38 and § 38 a (the latter
introducing the new regime).
42
The example given of medicines that are “used in the same way” is that tablets
and capsules are both for oral intake.
43
The Danish Health Autority was recently split up into four different authorities
and the relevant authority today is the Danish Medicines Agency. The Agency
has in this connection invited the pharmaceutical companies to make the
Agency aware of they are the proprietor of a patent on a specific indication,
but this is not included as such in the law.
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drug is being prescribed.
2. Confidentiality Concerns
The desire to protect patient confidentiality may be seen as a
reason to oppose prescription by indication. If such a system is to
work, robust data protection regimes will be necessary. Technological
advances should reassure patients that their personal health
information is secure and will remain confidential. After dispensing,
there is no need to maintain a link between the individual and the
prescribed product simply for purposes of recording and analyzing
data on the number of prescriptions dispensed for each indication. The
data should be anonymized before it is enters a database that for
monitoring prescriptions by indication that could potentially be used
to facilitate the enforcement of patents for repurposed drugs.
C. Issue: Regulatory Exclusivity
1. The Current System
The medicines regulatory system is harmonized in Europe. The
European Medicines Directive44 rewards the investment and risk of
bringing a product to market with a prescribed period of time, during
which no unauthorized third party may obtain a generic marketing
authorization for the same medicinal product.45 The reward of
regulatory protection may therefore incentivize investment without
the onerous patent system requirements of novelty and inventive step.
Regulatory exclusivities can be a powerful tool for marketing
authorization holders that can be enforced against third parties. In
2014, the Court of Justice in the European Union in the Olainfarm
case46 gave judicial backing to the right of marketing authorization
holders to challenge the grant of marketing authorization to third
parties in breach of regulatory exclusivity.
A market authorization holder benefits from the period of

44

Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6
November 2001 on the Community Code relating to medicinal products for
human use, 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67.
45
Id. at art. 10.
46
See C-104/12, Olainfarm (Judgment), 2014 ECR.

2017]

INNOVATION IN KNOWN DRUGS

269

marketing and data exclusivity that attaches to a new product
authorized under a “full” application. A full application must include
substantial safety and efficacy data generated from large scale clinical
trials. This route to gaining marketing authorization is usually only
used for the approval of new drugs where there is no pre-existing
safety and efficacy data, and so significant data must be generated by
the company developing the drug.
Any new products authorized via a full marketing authorization
application made since November 20, 2005 benefit from a period of
eight years of "data exclusivity", during which no third party may rely
on the data provided in the marketing authorization dossier for the
purposes of obtaining a generic marketing authorization.47 The period
runs from the date of marketing authorization grant. There is a
concurrent ten-year period of "market exclusivity" during which the
third party cannot use its authorization to market the generic product
for another two years. This period holds even if the third party has
obtained a generic marketing authorization by relying on the data in
the reference product dossier following the expiry of the eight-year
data exclusivity term. 48
The regulatory protection system contains further mechanisms
that aim to incentivize research and development of novel products,
and to some extent try to incentivize further development of products
that have already received marketing authorization. These are
described briefly below.

a. +1 Market Exclusivity
If a marketing authorization holder produces the necessary data to
show safety and efficacy for an authorized product in a new treatment
indication within the first eight years of authorization, they will be
rewarded with an extra year of market exclusivity.49 This means that,
where a holder could produce the safety and efficacy data, the

47

See supra note 41.
Id.
49
Council Directive 01/83, art. 10(1), 2001 O.J. (L 311/67) (EC).
48
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medicinal product would benefit from eleven years of market
exclusivity in total.50
One year of data exclusivity is also available for prescription
products that are reclassified to products available over the counter as
a result of significant pre-clinical tests or clinical trials.51
In addition, one year of data exclusivity is currently available for
new indications developed for well-established substances provided
that “significant” pre-clinical or clinical studies have been carried out
in relation to the new indication.52
b. Orphan Market Exclusivity
In 2001, new European legislation introduced a reward of market
exclusivity for companies that developed drugs for treatment of socalled “orphan conditions.”53 This legislation was designed to
incentivize discovery of treatments for conditions that would not
otherwise garner the interest of pharmaceutical companies, either
because there are a very small number of patients who would require
such treatment or because of other factors that mean the treatment area
would otherwise not receive financial investment.54
Orphan market exclusivity lasts for ten years from the grant of
market authorization of the product for the orphan indication. 55 It
differs from the scope of data and market protection offered to nonorphan products. It is in one sense narrower in that it protects only the
orphan indication. It does not, for example, prevent a third party from
obtaining a marketing authorization for the same product in a different
indication. It is, however, broader in scope and duration than “normal”
data exclusivity and market exclusivity because it prevents regulatory
authorities from accepting an application for a marketing
authorization for any similar medicinal product in the same indication
for a period of ten years.56 Exclusivity is therefore granted, not just for

50

Id.
Id. at art. 74(a)
52
Id. at art. 10(5)
53
Council Regulation 141/2000, 1999 O.J. (L 18/1) (EC) (the Orphan Regulation).
54
Id. recitals.
55
Id. at Article 8(1).
56
Id.
51
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identical products–but also for similar products.
c. PIPs and Pediatric Extensions
All medicines for which marketing authorization applications
were made on or after July 26, 2008, are required either to have
research conducted into the safety and efficacy of the drug in pediatric
populations by completing an agreed pediatric investigation plan
(“PIP”), or to agree to a waiver.57 The waiver exception may apply
where it would be unnecessary or inappropriate to conduct studies in
pediatric populations or where it may be shown that the treatment does
not represent a significant therapeutic benefit over existing treatments
for pediatric patients.
Completion of the PIP brings with it reward, even if it fails to lead
to the authorization of a pediatric indication.58 The type of reward
obtained for PIP completion depends on the regulatory status of the
product in question. For non-orphan designated products that are
protected by an SPC (or a patent that is eligible for grant of an SPC)
the patent holder will be rewarded with a six-month extension of their
SPC.59 For orphan designated products, the term of orphan market
exclusivity will be extended from ten to twelve years.60
The pediatric medicines legislation also introduced pediatric use
marketing authorizations or PUMAs.61 These are a dedicated
marketing authorization for medicinal products indicated exclusively

57

Council Regulation 1901/06, 2006 O.J. (L 378/1) (EU). This regulation is
referred to as the “Pediatric Regulation.” There were also provisions
introduced in this Regulation to require that MA holders who wished to add
new indications, including pediatric indications, new pharmaceutical forms
and new routes of administration to their MA would be required to complete a
PIP, even for products for which the MA application was made prior to 26
July 2008.
58
Provided that the results of the studies conducted are reflected in the summary
of product characteristics and, if appropriate, in the package leaflet of the
medicinal product. See Id. at art. 36, 37.
59
Council Regulation 1901/06, art. 36, 2006 O.J. (L 378/1) (EU).
60
Id. art. 37.
61
Id. art. 30.
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for use in the pediatric population, or subsets thereof. PUMA
applications benefit from an 8 + 2 period of data and market
protection. They are also eligible for a partial exemption from certain
application fees.62 In fact, PUMAs serve as an example of a regulatory
exclusivity right incentive system that has been largely ineffective.
Industry was not convinced that a PUMA would prevent off-label use
of the earlier product authorized within the PUMA product’s pediatric
indication. As such, very few companies have shown an interest in
PUMA authorization.
2. Regulatory Exclusivities for Repurposed Drugs
Some of the regulatory measures to incentivize development of
already authorized medicines appear successful. For example, a great
number of marketing authorization holders have conducted the work
necessary to obtain the +1 market exclusivity extension for adding a
new indication of “significant clinical benefit” within the first eight
years of grant of the marketing authorization. The year of exclusivity
available for new indications for well-established substances may
provide some incentive for developing new indications for known
drugs. However, the number of indications actually approved via this
route seems to be relatively few, suggesting that it is not a particularly
effective incentive. The year of exclusivity available for prescription
products that can be converted to over-the-counter products bestows
a real advantage in that market. The pediatric legislation has also
generated treatments for pediatric populations that would not
otherwise have been investigated and authorized. The legislation
makes such work a requirement for the grant of a marketing
authorization, (subject to any waiver) but the incentives on offer are
attractive to marketing authorization holders.
Unfortunately, the regulatory system in Europe does not yet
contain effective incentives for the development of known drugs once
the initial 10 + 1 year period of regulatory exclusivity has expired. The
legislation stipulates that all developments of a given medicinal

62

European Medicine Agency Questions and answers on the paediatric use
marketing authorisation (PUMA) EMA/753370/2011 Rev 1, at
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2011/09/WC
500112071.pdf
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product made by the original developer (e.g. new indications, new
methods of administration, dosing regimes, etc.) will fall within what
is known as the same “global marketing authorization” (“GMA”) for
that product.63 The date of the first authorization is the date from
which the regulatory exclusivity attaching to all of the products within
the same GMA will run. The purpose of the GMA concept is to
prevent marketing authorization holders from effectively extending
the monopoly enjoyed by their product by obtaining new periods of
regulatory exclusivity for every minor development of their product.
This is sometimes referred to as "evergreening". Assuming there is no
patent protection in place, this allows generic products to compete
effectively with the original product once the relevant period of
regulatory exclusivity has expired. But, on the other hand, it leaves
little room for reward for a genuine innovation related to a repurposed
drug. Currently, the protection provided by regulatory exclusivities is
inadequate incentive in itself to promote investigation into new uses
for known drugs.

D. Potential Solution: A New Market Exclusivity Right
It would be perfectly possible to devise a new market or data
exclusivity right to protect repurposed drugs. The reward available
should be proportionate with the size and/or value of the innovation.
For example, the duration of the exclusivity can be shorter for
innovation in known compounds than it is for new compounds. To
achieve this, it may be necessary, as with the orphan medicinal
product system, to show that certain requirements are met in order to
receive the reward of exclusivity. For example, the treatment provides

63

Council Directive 01/83, art. 6(1), 2001 O.J. (L 311/67) (EC) (The only way that
a follow on product e.g. isomer, mixture of isomers, complex or derivative or
salt of a previously authorized subject can come outside of the GMA of the
earlier product is if the applicant can show that the development differs in
properties with regard to safety and efficacy from the substance previously
authorized).
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a significant benefit over pre-existing treatments and/or the treatment
meets an otherwise unmet need. This reward is much more flexible as
compared to the patent system.
Without changes to prescribing and dispensing systems, the
enforcement of any such new regulatory exclusivity right would run
into the same sorts of problems as are currently seen in the
enforcement of second medical use patents. The earlier authorized
product will still be open to generic competition at some stage during
the regulatory exclusivity of the later developed product. It may be
that the earlier product is open to generic competition prior to
authorization of the later product. Assuming that the dosage forms and
strengths, etc. are equivalent, the difficulty, as with the patent system,
is in preventing off-label use of the earlier authorized product for the
newly discovered use. This makes the market for the “repurposed
product” substantially less attractive than for a new medicinal product.
A new market exclusivity right would only provide an attractive
reward and therefore an effective incentive for repurposing of known
drugs if it were coupled with a system of mandatory prescription by
indication, as discussed above in relation to the enforcement of patent
protection. Such a system would ensure that only the developer of the
repurposed product would benefit from the new prescriptions and
increased market generated by the development of the repurposed
drug.
E. Issue: Pricing and Reimbursement
The price that can be achieved for any pharmaceutical product is
a key incentive for developing it and bringing it to market. In Europe,
procedures for determining the pricing and reimbursement of
medicines are not harmonized. Pricing and reimbursement are
therefore set through the different health schemes in each country and
the applicable rules differ in each country. Nevertheless, some broad
observations about pricing and reimbursement in Europe can be
drawn. Most national price and reimbursement systems and legislation
in Europe focus on cost containment measures and do not currently
incentivize the development of repurposed drugs.
As things currently stand, it is very difficult to get a premium price
for a repurposed drug product. If the drug is known, and there is no
patent protection covering the repurposed drug, the product will most
likely get a generic price. It is doubtful that the payers will even
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engage in a discussion about the added value that such repurposed
drugs can provide. These drugs are likely to be clustered with the
pharmaceutical products containing the same active substance no
matter how beneficial they are to the patients and society as a whole.
It may be also possible—for example in Germany—that such drugs
will be tendered together with price being often the only
differentiating selection criteria and taking no notice of the additional
patient health benefit.64
Even if the repurposed drug is covered by a patent, it is
questionable whether the developer will be able to get a premium price
for repurposing these medicines. Below, two different types of
repurposed drugs provide examples of how the current system may
preclude them from gaining a price that reflects the investment that
must be made to develop them.
1. New formulations
New formulations can provide significant benefits to patients. For
example, reformulating a drug that needs to be injected into one that
can be taken orally as a tablet provides increased convenience for the
patient and is likely to improve patient compliance with the course of
treatment. Despite these potential benefits for patients, the price of
reformulated drugs is usually based on a benchmark of the price of the
old product.
Germany is a good example of a country where the benchmark for
the price of a new formulation is the price of the old product. Indeed,
in 2003 a mandatory manufacturer's rebate of 6 percent was
introduced in Germany (which has been increased up to 16 percent
from 2010 to 2014, currently reduced to 7 percent). It applied to
patented medicinal products, available on prescription only, for which
no reference price group exists and which are dispensed by
community pharmacies or hospital pharmacies for the out-patient
sector. In context of this regime, the German legislator also
introduced a price moratorium in 2010, which rules that newly
introduced medicinal products identical in active substance and

64

See E.g., decision of the 2nd Public Procurement Tribunal on 29 January 2015
(VK 2 – 119/14); see also Section 130a (8) Social Code Book 5.
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comparable in pharmaceutical form to medicinal products already
placed on the market in the past by the same pharmaceutical
entrepreneur, may only be priced on the basis of the initial product; a
new indication is not relevant.65 A significant increase from 6 to 16
percent was imposed in 2010 and in order to avoid circumventions of
this rebate by increasing the price, a “price moratorium” was created
at the same time.66 According to this price moratorium, newly
introduced medicinal products identical in active substance and
comparable in pharmaceutical form to medicinal products already
placed on the market in the past by the same pharmaceutical
entrepreneur, may only be priced on the basis of the initial product.
The price moratorium and the respective anti-avoidance regulation
therefore apply to new formulations, which must be priced on basis of
the price of the first product. This cost containment regime applies
regardless of whether the new formulation is also authorized for
additional indications.
Under this German rebate regime, the price may actually be lower
for the new or improved formulation. Supposing that a company
developed a new dosage regimen of a known drug that involves less
active substance than the original product, the company would be
likely to obtain a lower price for the new formulation. Indeed, the price
of the new formulation will be proportionate to the amount of active
substance in the pharmaceutical product.67 Therefore even though the
new formulation is more convenient for the patient and less likely to
trigger adverse events, it will get a price lower than the price of the
original product.
Another example comes from Poland, where the local
medicines regulations require that the first “equivalent” of an
authorized medicine must be priced 25 percent lower than the earlier
authorized drug in the first authorized formulation.68 This is
irrespective of whether the new “equivalent medicine” is a simple

65

Section 130a (1a) and (3a) Social Code Book 5; Bundestagsdrucksache 18/201,
7 sqq.
66
Section 130a [3a] Social Code Book Five.
67
Regulation of the GKV-Spitzenverband according to Section 130a (3a) Social
Code Book 5, dated as of 22 October 2010; Bundestagsdrucksache 17/2170,
37 sqq.
68
Act of 12 May 2011 on Reimbursement of Medicines, Foodstuffs Intended for
Particular Nutritional Use and Medical Devices (Journal of Laws of 2015
item 345 as amended).
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copy of the known drug for the same indication or whether it is a novel
formulation, which may provide additional health benefits in areas of
important patient unmet need.
2. New uses
Repurposing a known drug by identifying and testing new
therapeutic uses for the product and subsequently extending the
authorized therapeutic indications by the marketing authorization
holder of the first use is one of the events that may trigger a renegotiation of the price and reimbursement for this product with the
relevant authorities.69 During the re-negotiation, the authorities will
most likely claim that the figures on which the original price were
granted, mainly in respect of the estimated consumption, are no longer
valid and will put pressure the marketing authorization holder to bring
the price down. Often, when the relevant pricing authority estimates
an increase in the consumption of the product due to the new
indications approved, the price is likely to be reduced in order to
maintain a fixed expenditure for the product. Such an approach
actually discourages development of new uses for medicines that are
already on the market. The marketing authorization holder is unlikely
to get a premium price for the new use but the development may also
trigger a price cut for the existing use.
F. Potential Solution: Differentiation by Indication
Although there are problems with the current situation, pricing and
reimbursement systems also present opportunities for the reward of
repurposing drugs. More advantageous pricing could be offered for
products in new indications of established drugs. Again, this would
require the introduction of data gathering on the use for which a drug

69

An example is the Italian CIPE determination laying down the P&R procedure,
dated 1 February 2001, article 7. In Germany it is for medicines falling under
the AMNOG regime cf. Section 130b [3a] Social Code Book Five. Article 94
of the Spanish Medicinal Products Act 25/1990 and Article R163-12 of the
French Code de la sécurité sociale contain similar provisions.
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is being prescribed. There could be different prices offered for
different therapeutic value.
1. An Example: Reimbursement in Belgium
Belgium operates a system whereby the list of medicinal products
that are eligible for reimbursement is divided into “chapters”
depending on the nature or reimbursement status of the product. For
products included in chapter I, all registered indications are
reimbursed, whereas the reimbursement of products included in
chapter II and IV is subject to specific conditions.70 This allows
reimbursement of a given pharmaceutical to differ depending upon the
use for which it is prescribed.
II.

Facilitating Access to Innovation

Incentives are not the only factor to consider when analyzing the
future of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry and how to
encourage the development of repurposed drug products. Another
important factor to consider is access to innovation. Examples of the
different areas to which access needs to be improved in order to
facilitate innovation are described below.
A. Access to Pipeline
Collaborations that allow exchange of information relating to
industry drug portfolios and pipelines will be key to successful
repurposing of known drugs going forward. Collaborations might
include those between industry partners or between industry and
academic institutions or governments. Collaborations, whereby
industry portfolios and expertise are shared, are more likely to
generate viable repurposed products. An example of such an initiative
is provided by the activities of the UK-based Medical Research
Council (“MRC”).71 The MRC is a non-departmental public body
funded through the UK Government's science and research budget. It

70

Art. 1, 11° of the Belgian Royal Decree of 21 December 2001 on the
procedures, terms and conditions regarding the reimbursement of medicinal
products.
71
More information about the MRC can be found at http://www.mrc.ac.uk/
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has run a number of initiatives with the pharmaceutical industry that
seek to harness the potential of open access to data to drive
development of known drugs. GlaxoSmithKline, AstraZeneca, Pfizer,
and Johnson & Johnson have all contributed experimental compounds
to the public domain for development with the MRC. The compounds
that have been contributed are those that have received millions of
dollars of research effort from their donors but that have failed to reach
the market as intended for commercial or other reasons. 72 UK
academics are to apply for MRC funding to study the compounds. The
company contributing the compound would have first option on
development rights to any new medicines arising from the research.73
The MRC has also entered into a strategic collaboration with
AstraZeneca to create a center for early drug discovery at the
AstraZeneca R&D center in Cambridge, UK.74 The idea is that MRCsponsored researchers will work alongside AstraZeneca scientists in
the screening group to “identify new methods to better understand a
range of diseases and potential treatment options.” Under the scheme,
AstraZeneca have granted access to over two million molecules in
their compound library.
B. Access to Data and Data Mining Tools
Over the past five or so years, ease of access to data and the
sophistication with which it may be manipulated and analyzed have
opened the pharmaceutical industry up to new businesses, new
business models, and new routes to discovery of better treatments.
There is an emerging trend towards encouraging opening up
access to clinical data by policy makers in Europe. The first of January
2015 saw the entry into effect of the European Medicines Agency’s
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Id.
Id.
74
See AstraZeneca and MRC enter strategic collaboration to create new centre
for early drug discovery in Cambridge, UK, MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
(Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.mrc.ac.uk/news/browse/astrazeneca-and-mrcenter-strategic-collaboration-to-create-new-centre-for-early-drug-discoveryin-cambridge-uk/.
73
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clinical transparency provisions for all marketing authorization
applications submitted after that date.75 Amongst other things, this
policy requires the proactive publication of all clinical and nonclinical data submitted as part of the marketing authorization
application.76 This will equate to the publication of an unprecedented
volume of data regarding drug behavior, efficacy, and safety. Anyone
wishing to access data under the scheme will be required to confirm
that such use is not for commercial purposes.77 Nevertheless, it signals
the beginning of even greater availability of information that may lead
to better understanding and dissemination of data regarding how drugs
work. Increased understanding brings with it the potential to discover
new treatments.
There are already examples of businesses in the health care
industry that have become successful largely because of their ability
to gather and analyze data. For instance, part of the California
biotechnology company 23andMe’s business78 is providing a salivabased direct-to-consumer personal genome test that relies on
compiling and comparing data against a huge genome database. One
of the other parts of the business is using the large pool of data that
they have to partner with academics and industry.79 They are even said
to be pursing drug development themselves.80
The example described above shows that analyses of datasets of
known drug behavior can suggest direction for further research. Such
analyses may be conducted relatively inexpensively and may
potentially open up drug discovery and development to additional

For more information on the EMA’s clinical trials transparency policy, see
Background to clinical data publication policy, EUROPEAN MEDICINES
AGENCY,
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/special_topics/general/g
eneral_content_000556.jsp (last visited May 23, 2016).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
See 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/en-gb/ (last visited May 23, 2016).
79
23andMe sets stage for stronger ties with pharma, FIERCEBIOTECH (Nov. 29,
2012, 7:43 AM), http://www.fiercebiotech.com/story/23andme-sets-stagestronger-ties-pharma/2012-11-29.
80
Forbes interview with Ann Wojcicki 23andMe’s founder and CEO. See
Matthew Herper, In Big Shift, 23andMe Will Invent Drugs Using Customer
Data, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2015, 8:01 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2015/03/12/23andme-enters-thedrug-business-just-as-apple-changes-it/#7dc1a8992278.
75
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players in the industry, and with it the potential for increased
innovation and competition. Collected information on known drug
mechanisms of action can drive virtual drug discovery, either in
suggesting new uses for known drugs or predicting the effects of
untested drugs. In the near term, the potential is clear for these sorts
of analyses to suggest new uses for known drugs. Developing known
drugs for new purposes in this way is particularly attractive because it
brings with it the advantage of knowing that such drugs are safe,
thereby bypassing the need to extensively test the safety of that
product, and so shortening the development timeline; making it more
predictable and lowering cost.
Until relatively recently, discovery of new uses for known drugs
has often been by serendipity. Well-known and successful drug
repurposings, such as Viagra, were discovered whilst testing the drugs
for treatment of other unrelated disorders. “Big data” gives the
potential for greater direction for this route of discovering new
treatments. For example, Dr. Dakshanamurthy of Georgetown
University in Washington D.C.81 has matched publically available
data about the structure of drug molecules with databases of proteins
found in the human body and the sort of molecules they interact with.
When testing the model they found it was able in 91 percent of the
3,671 drugs tested to match a drug to a protein known to be its target.82
It is easy to imagine how a system with a sufficient volume of suitably
specific data could create fast and reliable suggestions for alternate
uses for known molecules. Indeed, the researchers showed that the
system was already able to suggest avenues for possible future
research, both of new uses for known products and even of molecules
that have not yet been produced physically.83
C. Regulatory Early Access Tools
The European Medicines Agency is making serious attempts to be
able to provide swift market access for medicines using the legislative

81

See Computers may give new life to old medicines, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 11,
2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21560236.
82
Id.
83
Id.
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tools currently available. A pragmatic approach to regulatory
assessment with shorter regulatory assessment procedures that take
into account real life evidence are best suited for innovations related
to new uses for old molecules. The risk to patients is greatly reduced
where the product has already undergone the safety testing necessary
to take the product to market. Faster regulatory access schemes would
be a valuable tool in opening up the pharmaceutical industry to new
entrants and increasing innovation. Shorter, cheaper, and more
effective regulatory processes with reduced time to market can help to
increase innovation by reducing cost and lowering the barriers to
market entry.
Some examples of the ways in which the established medicine
regulatory process is being adapted to provide fast, intelligent market
access for novel medicinal products are described below.
Overwhelmingly these processes are reserved at present for medicines
that serve the most urgent and important patient need. Hopefully,
some of these processes, or processes similar to them, will be available
more widely in the future, and will be used to encourage market access
for new medicines developed from known substances, since their
known safety profiles should allow shortened research and
development timelines.
1. STAMP
In 2015 the European Commission set up STAMP (the
Commission Expert Group on Safe and Timely Access to Medicines
for Patients). 84 The goal of STAMP is stated as being to “exchange
views and information about the experience of Member States,
examine national initiatives and identify ways to use the existing EU
regulatory tools more effectively. The main goal is to further improve
safe and timely access and availability of medicines for patients.”85
Under active consideration by STAMP at the moment are conditional

84

See Early access tools: accelerated assessment and conditional marketing
authorization, EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY (Oct. 15, 2015),
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Presentation/2015/
11/WC500196321.pdf and Commission Expert Group on Safe and Timely
Access to Medicines for Patients ("STAMP"), EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/health/documents/pharmaceuticalcommittee/stamp/index_en.htm (last visited May 23 2015).
85
Id.
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marketing authorizations, accelerated assessment and PRIME and
adaptive pathways. These alternative routes to marketing
authorization operate under current EU regulatory tools.
2. Conditional Marketing Authorizations
A conditional marketing authorization is available currently in
specific circumstances where the benefit-risk balance of a given
product is such that the need for immediate availability of the product
outweighs the limitations of having less comprehensive data than
would otherwise be required to grant marketing authorization.86 This
is typically the case for products where there is a patient population
with unmet medical need, seriously debilitating or life-threatening
disease, a rare disease, or use in emergency situations.87 In such cases,
it is possible for the European Medicines Agency’s Committee for
Medicinal Products for Human Use to recommend the early approval
of a marketing authorization on the basis of less complete clinical data,
and subject to certain specific pharmacovigilance88 and other data
collection obligations. The granting of a conditional marketing
authorization allows medicines to reach patients with unmet medical
needs earlier than might otherwise be the case, and ensures that
additional data on a product are generated, submitted, assessed, and
acted upon.
The Netherlands’ Ministry of Health launched a project in 2011 to
investigate whether it might be possible to encourage further
development of known authorized medicines for treatment of new

86

Provision for conditional marketing authorizations is made in Regulation (EC)
No. 726/2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and
supervisions of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and
establishing a European Medicines Agency and they are further defined in
Regulation (EC) No. 507/2006 on the conditional marketing authorisation for
medicinal products for human use falling within the scope of Regulation (EC)
No 726/2004.
87
Id.
88
Pharmacovigilance is the term used for monitoring the effects of drugs after
they have been licensed for use, especially in order to identify and evaluate
previously unreported adverse reactions.
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diseases, so-called “drug rediscovery.” The rationale is that without
some incentive, industry will not further develop known drugs.
Quicker and easier routes to market may be one such incentive, in
particular where there is already known off-label use of that product.
89

3. Accelerated Assessment
The pharmaceutical legislation contains within it provisions for
“accelerated assessment procedures” to meet the “legitimate
expectations of patients and to take account of the increasingly rapid
progress of science and therapies.”90 These accelerated procedures are
reserved under the legislation for medicinal products of major
therapeutic interest and may be requested by the applicant for
authorization of such a medicine when making an application. What
is meant by “major therapeutic interest” or “major public health
interest” is not defined. It will be for the applicant to justify eligibility
for the procedure and in particular that the medicinal product
addresses to a significant extent the “unmet medical needs for
maintaining and improving the health of the Community.” This will
be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
4. Adaptive Licensing
The concept of adaptive licensing seeks to maximize the positive
impact of new drugs on public health by balancing timely access for
patients with the need to provide adequate evolving information on
benefits and harms. This will be done by using the existing regulatory
processes within the existing EU legal framework.
Medicines Adaptive Pathways to Patients (MAPPs) or Adaptive
Pathways is an EU-level initiative that seeks to provide timely and
potential early access to promising medicines that address significant
unmet medical needs.91 The general principle is that approval and
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al_content_000601.jsp (last visited May 23, 2015).

2017]

INNOVATION IN KNOWN DRUGS

285

reimbursement decisions are made using a more flexible framework,
allowing launch of the therapy based on limited, yet clearly promising,
evidence that can be expanded and assessed regularly post-launch.
A pilot scheme was started in 2014 in which the European
Medicines Agency called for the involvement of real-world medicines
in development.92 The European Medicines Agency plan to make their
first report on the pilot scheme in 2016 but have already reported to
STAMP on their initial experiences with it. To date, 20 candidate
products have been selected for in-depth discussion of the adaptive
licensing pathway with the applicant.
5. PRIME scheme (Priority Medicines)
The PRIME (PRIority MEdicines) scheme is a European
Medicines Agency initiative which aims to enhance early dialogue to
facilitate accelerated assessment of priority medicines.93 It is part of
the European Medicines Agency initiative to accelerate patient access
to medicines that address unmet needs. This includes the adaptive
pathways pilot, the accelerated assessment, and conditional marketing
authorization pathways.94 PRIME is concurrent to those initiatives,
seeking to review their impact on authorization of priority medicines.
It also considers how to enhance and reinforce early dialogue and
regulatory support to stimulate innovation, optimize development,
and enable accelerated assessment of these medicines. As with
accelerated development, conditional marketing authorizations and
adaptive processing, PRIME is focused on medicines of major public
health interest and within the existing regulatory framework. The
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PRIME initiative is currently under public consultation. The European
Medicines Agency expects to launch PRIME in the first quarter of
2016.
6. ADAPT SMART
ADAPT SMART stands for Accelerated Development of
Appropriate Patients Therapies, a Sustainable, Multi-stakeholder
Approach from Research to Treatment-outcomes.95 This is an
initiative led by the European Medicines Agency and run in parallel
to the adaptive pathways pilot project. The ADAPT SMART program
was set up to investigate the conceptual framework that may, in the
future, be used in adaptive pathways, including tools and
methodologies.96 ADAPT SMART is run by the Innovative Medicines
Initiative (IMI2), the European public-private collaboration for which
the European Medicines Agency is the scientific leader.97 The aim of
the ADAPT SMART initiative is to facilitate and accelerate the
availability of the MAPPs pathway to authorization to all healthcare
stakeholders.
D. Access to Funding
It may not be possible to encourage the development of new uses
for known drugs if the funding for such research must come entirely
from the pharmaceutical industry. The industry has already shown that
it is willing to explore government partnerships and increased
interaction with academia in order to increase development
opportunities and lead to the discovery of new treatments. An example
of such collaboration is the Innovative Medicines Initiative (“IMI”).98
The IMI is Europe's largest public-private initiative, which supports
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collaborative research projects and builds networks of industrial and
academic experts in order to boost pharmaceutical innovation in
Europe. It is a partnership between the European Union (represented
by the European Commission) and the pharmaceutical industry
(represented by EFPIA).
Launched in 2008, IMI is the world's biggest public-private
partnership in the life sciences.99 The aim of the initiative is to speed
up development of, and improve patient access to, innovative
medicines (particularly in areas of unmet medical or social need). The
IMI invites consortia of small and medium-sized enterprises, midsized companies, patients’ organizations, regulatory authorities,
academic teams, industry, hospitals, and other organizations to
respond to or generate proposals for projects that will address the
challenges that affect public health. The IMI provides funding and
other support for these projects.
The IMI operates a number of projects, some of which are focused
on specific health issues and some of which are focused on broader
challenges in drug development–such as drug/vaccine safety and the
use of stem cells for drug discovery.100 A number of the IMI initiatives
use big data and modeling to aid treatment discovery. For example,
the Pharma-Cog initiative aims to predict cognitive properties of new
drug candidates for neurodegenerative diseases in early clinical
development.101 Pharma-Cog seeks to bring together databases of
previously conducted clinical trials and combine the results from
blood tests, brain scans, and behavioral tests, to develop a 'signature'
that will give more accurate information on the progression of the
disease and the likely effect of candidate drugs than current
methods.102 Alongside the modeling, studies are conducted with
laboratory models, healthy volunteers, and patients in order to better
predict good new drugs as early as possible.
Claimed successes of the IMI program include the generation of a
line of human pancreatic beta cells (the cells which go wrong in
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diabetes), the creation of a simple computer test that predicts if a
potential drug will be harmful to the heart, and the creation of novel
clinical trial designs for schizophrenia and Alzheimer’s disease
treatments.103
E. Access to Patients
As the transparency requirements with respect to the industry’s
clinical data increases, so does patients’ online access to information
regarding medical conditions and treatment. European laws that
prohibit advertising of prescription medicines to patients act
effectively as a bar to the pharmaceutical industry discussing their
treatments with patients based in the European Union.104 Attempts by
the European Commission to introduce new laws to increase patient
access to reliable information on prescription medicines have been
rejected;105 the often cited concern being that changes to these laws
may lead to a US-style market in which consumers are marketed to by
the pharmaceutical industry rather than provided with the information
with which to help them make their own decisions.
However, the lack of territorial boundaries online means that
patients who want to read about treatments and share their questions
and concerns will find the information somewhere. Inaccurate and
untested information may thrive in an environment in which those
with the most information about the treatments in question, being the
pharmaceutical industry, are prevented from engaging in the
discussion. New laws that may meet the objective of providing
patients with the information they want and require, but that
respectfully maintain a limitation on large-scale “advertising” (in the
traditional sense), would be a welcome development to increasing
patient focused innovation. The industry could listen actively to their
customers and provide feedback with a level of understanding and
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speed that is not possible currently. It would help them understand
what the patients want and may guide more patient-focused
development opportunities.
F. Patent Pools
Patent pools106 can facilitate drug development as they widen
access to protected technology. Patentee members of a patent pool are
encouraged to share their drug patents with other members of the pool.
The members of the pool benefit from availability of the technology
to, for example, produce the technology themselves or in some cases
develop the technology without fear of being sued for patent
infringement by the patentee.
An example of a patent pool is the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP),
which is a United Nations-backed organization offering a public
health-driven business model.107 It was devised on patent pool
principles and works through a system of voluntary licensing and
patent pooling. The MPP aims to lower the prices of HIV,
tuberculosis, hepatitis C, malaria, and tuberculosis treatments in low
and middle-income countries and to facilitate the development of
better-adapted medicines.108 Under the MPP, patentees may be
compensated by a fair royalty under a license. The MPP works with
governments, industry and international organizations, as well as
those communities and people affected by HIV. To date, the MPP has
signed agreements for twelve antiretrovirals with six patent holders
and is working with 14 manufacturers on more than 50 projects to
develop HIV-licensed medicines.
G. Access for Third Party Developers
Many of the incentives that aim to encourage research and
development of new drugs may actually disincentivize further
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research and development of known drugs by third parties (i.e. by
anyone other than the originator of the original drug who is the
compound patent owner and marketing authorization holder). Patents
and market exclusivity protecting the known drug will prevent the
marketing of that product by a third party even if that third party had
completed studies to show that the product was effective in a different
treatment area. As it stands, therefore, there is in practice very little
development of known pharmaceuticals by third parties until after
patent and SPC expiry. Until then, all development potential lies with
the holder of the patent for the drug molecule.
An open question is whether this could be an area for further
consideration. Could, perhaps, third parties that discover new uses for
known medicinal products be permitted to benefit from certain carveouts of either patent or regulatory protection over the “reference” or
original product? Might provision be made for the benefit coming
from the third party development to be shared between the third party
and the originator? A “softer” option may be that the carveout may
apply in the EU only to SPCs and regulatory exclusivities rather than
the patents themselves, where the full 20-year term would have to be
respected. Another alternative could hypothetically be the adaptation
of the compulsory licensing provisions. Any such hypothetical regime
would certainly bring with it the potential to increase the incentive for
third parties to invest in further investigation of a medicinal product
once it had gained its initial marketing authorization. The question
would then be whether the remaining protection for the original drug
innovation is still sufficient to allow for a fair return.
CONCLUSION
A system to reward the development of repurposed drugs has the
potential to benefit all of the relevant stakeholders. The
pharmaceutical industry would have more products coming through
pipeline. Patients would be presented with greater choice of more
efficacious and safer medicines, more information and certainty
regarding treatment options, and more timely access to treatment.
Clinicians would need to rely less on off-label treatments, would have
a greater number of treatment choices, and could be more confident
about the information they receive. Finally, the healthcare systems
will benefit from having healthier patients that may remain
contributors to society and the national economy.
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A system to reward the research and development in known
medicinal products is justified, but any such system must be
considered carefully. The goal should be to incentivize and promote
research and development that lead to new and useful treatments. It
should not create monopolies over products that restrict legitimate
market entry and provide disproportionate reward to trivial
therapeutic advances. The ideal system of incentives would therefore
offer reward relative to the size of the innovation and patient benefit
and would be fairly balanced against the benefit to patients of timely
generic market entry.
Building such a system requires consideration of both incentives
to innovate but also how different types of access that facilitate such
innovation can be improved. A meaningful framework of incentives
cannot be achieved through changes to either the patent or regulatory
system in isolation as they operate currently. Changes to prescribing
and dispensing practices are also required: specifically a method of
specifying which indication a medicine with more than one use has
been prescribed for on the prescription is critical. Without knowing
for what indication a medicinal product is being prescribed and
dispensed, both the patent and regulatory systems lack the necessary
data to be able to form the basis of a fair and enforceable system of
incentives for repurposed drugs.
As well as incentives, access that facilitates innovation must also
be considered. Access to drug portfolios, pipelines, and funding needs
to be improved through collaboration between industry, governments,
and academia. Increased access to clinical data, technology, and
patients will facilitate informed and targeted drug development.
Access to the market could be enhanced by the introduction of shorter
and less onerous regulatory procedures for new uses for known drugs,
and by allowing early market access for independently developed uses
for known drugs before the expiry of exclusivity.
Finally, we need to convince payers to increase their willingness
to reward the “repurposing” of known drugs. This would involve
setting up appropriate procedures enabling them to assess the added
value of these products as well as introducing systems of data
gathering on the use for which a drug is being prescribed.
Repurposed drugs have huge potential. It is important that the
systems are in place to incentivize and reward the research and
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development effort required to realize that potential. Getting the
balance right between incentivizing the development of new drugs and
encouraging the continued investigation of further possible uses for
such drugs could bring enormous benefits to all healthcare
stakeholders.109
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